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INTRODUCTION 
Although  economic  models  are usually built upon the assumption  that tastes are immu- 
table, this does not mean  that economists  actually  believe  this to be true. It is rather  the 
case  that  the modeling  of changing  preferences  hitherto  has not been  at the top of the 
research  agenda.  Gradually,  now  that  various  other  issues have  been  addressed,  the 
modeling  of changing  preferences  becomes  more important.  One observes, for example, 
an increasing  interest  in habit formation  in economic  models of consumer  behavior  (for 
example,  see Spinnewijn,  1981;  Phlips  and  Spinnewijn,  1981;  Blanciforti  and  Green, 
1983; Muellbauer,  1986). 
One of the areas where the notion of changing preferences  is least prominent,  yet most 
crucial,  is the analysis  of public policy.  The  economic  theory  of public  policy  is firmly 
rooted  in welfare  economics.  In principle, proposed  policy  measures  are to be judged  on 
the  basis  of  their  effect  on  the  welfare  of  the  members  of  society.  If preferences  are 
immutable,  it is often  easy  to decide  whether  a certain  policy  change  will improve  the 
welfare  of citizens  or not. For  instance,  if individuals  prefer  more  income  to less, then 
increasing  one individual’s income  and leaving all other incomes  unaffected  amounts  to 
a  Pareto  improvement  (no  one’s  welfare  decreases  and  one  individual’s  welfare 
improves).  Generally,  policies  that generate  Pareto  improvements  are considered  to be 
desirable. 
If, on the other hand, individuals are given to envy, so that as a result of the increase  in 
income  of  one  individual  other  individuals  tend  to  feel  worse  off,  one  can  no  longer 
conclude  that  the  income  increase  for  the  one  individual  constitutes  a  Pareto 
improvement. 
In this  article  we  review  a  so-called  theory  of  preference  formation,  developed  in 
Kapteyn  (1977),  which  addresses  precisely  the  problem  that  arises  in  the  situation 
sketched  above.  Specialized  to incomes,’  the theory  states that the welfare  an individual 
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derives  from  his income  depends  solely  on  the  ranking  of his income  in the  relevant 
income  distribution.  There  are  some  subtleties  with  respect  to  the  definition  of  the 
relevant  income  distribution  and with the problem  of how  to account  for variations  in 
household  composition,  which  will be dealt  with, but these do not affect  the basic idea. 
The theory  is akin to the notion of “relative  deprivation”  (cf. Stouffer,  Suchman,  DeVin- 
ney, Star, and Williams, Jr., 1949), but also to “adaptation  level theory”  (cf. Helson,  1964). 
Although  the theory  of preference  formation  can be formulated  in quite general  terms, 
to describe  the welfare  evaluation  of vectors  of commodities  (where  a commodity  may 
be just  about  anything  that yields pleasures),  we shall for simplicity  stick to the evalua- 
tion of incomes.  In the next section we briefly  describe  the individual  welfare  function  of 
income,  due to Van Praag  (1968,  197 l), which  measures  an individual’s evaluation  of 
different  income  levels. Then  the individual  welfare  function  of income  is liked up with 
the  theory  of preference  formation  and  formulates  an empirically  testable  model.  We 
then  present  the  results  of  estimation  of  the  model  for  a  household  panel  in  The 
Netherlands. 
Having  done  all this, the  resulting  model  is used  to  study  empirically  the  relation 
between  the  distribution  of  incomes  and  the  distribution  of  welfare  in  society.  We 
simulate  the effects  of various  policy  measures. 
THE  INDIVIDUAL  WELFARE  FUNCTION  OF  INCOME 
The  Individual  Welfare  Function  (WFI,  from  now  on)  is measured  by  asking  respon- 
dents2 in a survey  the following  so-called  income  evaluation  question  (IEQ): 
What  after-tax  family  income  very  bad  Dfl. 
would you consider,  in  your  bad  Dfl. 
circumstances  to  be  very  bad?  insufficient  Dfl. 
And  bad,  insufficient,  sufficient,  sufficient  Dfl. 
good,  and  very  good?  good  Dfl. 
Please  enter  an  amount  on  each  line  very  good  Dfl. 
The  formulation  of the IEQ varies  somewhat  between  different  surveys (for example 
see Kapteyn  and  Wansbeek,  1985a).  The  wording  given  here  comes  from  the  survey 
that is used  for the empirical  analysis reported  below. In the design of the questionnaire, 
care  has been  taken  that  before  answering  the IEQ, the respondent  has gained  a good 
understanding  of the notion of after-tax  family income. Actually  the respondent  has been 
asked  to compute  his own after-tax  family  income. 
In Figure  1, a hypothetical  response  to the IEQ has been plotted.  Income  (denoted  by 
y)  is measured  along  the horizontal  axis. The  verbal  labels  “very  good,”  “good,”  etc., 
have  been  associated  with the  midpoints  of  six equal  intervals  that  partition  the  [O,l) 
interval  on the vertical  axis. As a result the verbal  scale “very  bad, bad,.  . . very good”  is 
transformed  into a numerical  scale (denoted  by U(y)> I/ 12, 3/ 12,. . . , 11112. According 
to the theory  developed  by Van Praag  (1968,  197 l), the points should lie approximately 
on  a  lognormal  curve.  The  lognormal  curve  is then  the  respondent’s  WFI.  Because, 
generally,  the points  will not lie exactly  on a log normal  curve, the respondent’s  WFI is 
estimated  by  fitting  a  lognormal  function  to  the  scatter  of  points  by  means  of  least Preference  Formation,  hcomes  and  the  Distribution  of  Welfare  79 
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Figure 1. 
squares.  For  further  details,  see for  instance  Van  Praag  and  Kapteyn  (1973)  or  Van 
Herwaarden  and Kapteyn  ( 198 1). 
One of the assumptions  underlying  measurement  of the WFI is that verbal  labels can 
be associated  with equal  intervals  on a bounded  scale. The  validity  of this assumption 
has been investigated  by Buyze (1982)  and Antonides,  Kapteyn,  and Wansbeek  (1980). 
Both studies indicate  that the intervals are not exactly  equal, but that the quality assump- 
tion provides  a good  approximation. 
The  lognormal  function  is completely  determined  by  its parameters  ~1  and  u. The 
parameter  ~1  is a location  parameter;  exp(p> is the income  level evaluated  by 0.5. Thus, 
the larger  p (or exp(p>, for that matter)  is, the more income  one needs to attain a certain 
welfare  level. The  parameter  u determines  the slope of someone’s  WFI. The larger  u is, 
the flatter  a WFI will be. 
By  now  tens  of  thousands  of  WFI’s  have  been  estimated  in  the  countries  of  the 
European  Community  and  in the  United  States  (for  example,  see  Van  Herwaarden, 
Kapteyn,  and Van Praag,  1977; Colasanto,  Kapteyn,  and Van der Gaag,  1984). 
PREFERENCE  FORMATION  AND  THE  WFI 
It has often  been found  that the size distribution  of incomes  can be approximated  rather 
well by a lognormal  distribution  function. The  fact that an individual’s WFI can also be 
approximated  by a lognormal  distribution  function  might suggest a relationship  between 
a WFI  and  the  size distribution  of incomes.  In fact,  this is exactly  what  the  theory  of 
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First,  we should  note  that  different  people  “see”  different  income  distributions.  For 
instance,  someone  with  a  limited  education  and  a  low  income  may  have  friends  and 
acquaintances  who generally  have low incomes.  Thus this person  sees an income  distri- 
bution  with  mostly  low  incomes.  We  call the  income  distribution  an individual  sees a 
perceived  income  distribution.  A more  precise  definition  will be given in this article. 
Second,  the  economic  unit  that  shares  a  given  income  is the  household.  A  large 
income  for a large  household  need  not generate  more  consumption  possibilities  than  a 
small  income  for  a  small  household.  If  we  say  that  someone  perceives  an  income 
distribution,  then  we really  mean  that  he observes  the expenditures  other  people  make 
out of the income.  Expenditure  levels are thus indicators  of incomes.  In the case of the 
large  household  with the large  income  the observed  expenditure  level  may  actually  be 
modest.  The relevant  income  concept  is therefore  standardized  income,  that is household 
income  divided  by the number  of equivalent  adults in a household.  The  computation  of 
the number  of “equivalent  adults”  per household  is a matter  we will turn to later. 
Essentially,  the  theory  of  preference  formation  states  that  an  individual’s  WFI  is 
identical  to his perceived  income  distribution.  We turn now to a more  formal  statement 
of the theory. 
Let there be N individuals  in society. Time  is measured  in years, t = -00,.  . . , 0  where  t = 
0  represents  the  present.  At  each  moment  of  time  an  individual  n  (n  =  1,. . . , h9  is 
assumed  to assign nonnegative  reference  weights w,,k(t) to any individual k in society (k = 
l,...,N), 
N 
Ix  Wnk 0)  =  1. 
k=l 
The reference  weight w,k(t) indicates  the importance  individual  n attaches  to the income 
of individual  k at time  t. Obviously,  quite  a few of the w,k(t)  will be zero.  On the other 
hand,  w&t),  i.e., the weight  that individual  n attaches  to his own income  at time  t, may 
be substantial.  The set of individuals  with wnk(t) #  0, k #  n, will sometimes  be referred  to 
as n’s social reference  group  at time  t. 
Further,  let yk(t) be the  income  of individual  k  at time  t.3 Let ji(t)  be the number  of 
equivalent  adults in family  k at time  t. Then  we defined  the income  per equivalent  adult 
(or “per capita”  as we will often  say) of family  k at time  t by: 
j+‘(t) : =  y&)/f-k(l)  (1) 
We will also refer  to j4t)  as the “standardized  income”  of family  k at time  t. 
This bit of notation  allows for the definition  of a perceived  income  distribution  at time 
t for individual  n, 
C,,(jJll)  : =  2:  “‘,,k(l) 
{kljk(L)sy}  (2) 
One  can  get  some  intuition  for  this  definition  by  working  out  some  examples  (cf. 
Kapteyn  and  Wansbeek,  1985,  Section  5).  Notice,  for  instance,  that  if  everyone  in 
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cumulative  frequency  of all households  who  have  a standardized  income  less than  or 
equal to p. In this case G.(ylt) represents  the size distribution  of standardized  incomes  in 
society at time t. Generally  the reference  weights w&t)  are not all equal, since individual 
n does not assign equal weight to all families, but will tend to overweigh  his friends and 
acquaintances  and underweigh  people  he hardly  knows. 
In each period  t individual n perceives  a new income  distribution  G,(ylt). At time zero, 
he  has  perceived  a  sequence  of  income  distributions  that  will affect  his present  idea 
about what constitutes  a high income or a low income, say. We can aggregate  the G,,(ylt) 
to one presentty perceived  income distribution G,(y).  To that end a nonnegative  “memory 
function”  a,(t)  is  introduced,  which  describes  individual  n’s  weighting  of  perceived 
incomes  over  time. We assume, 
0 
r  an  (1) =  I  n =  1 , . .  . ., N.  (3) 
The  memory  function  is introduced  to allow for the fact  that possibly  events  that took 
place  a long time  ago will have less influence  on the present  perceptions  of individual  n 
than events  that took  place recently. 
The presently  perceived  income  distribution  function  G”(y) is now defined  as 
C,,(j)  :  =  2 Ull  MC,  (jw  (4) 
Let  U”(y) be  the  WFI  of  individual  n, that  is U, describes  how  he rates  standardized 
incomes  on a [O,l]-scale.  The  theory  of preference  formation  states that 
U,(Y)  =  C,,(j)  (5) 
Thus,  according  to the  theory  utility  is a completely  relative  concept.  The  utility  of a 
certain  per  capita  income  is equal  to  its relative  ranking  in  the  presently  perceived 
income  distribution. 
The Empirical Model 
To  operationalize  the  theory  and  to  keep  this article  self-contained  we have  to  go 
through  a rather  lengthy  and technical  analysis. Those  readers  who are mainly interested 
in the general  idea  and the  simulations  are advised  to skip to “Preference  Formation, 
Incomes,  and the Distribution  of Welfare”  below. 
First consider  the WFI in some more detail. The assumed  lognormality  implies that it 
can be written  as follows: 
U,(j)  =  N(ln  p; &,oJ  =  N ((In j-&Vo,,;O,l)  =  N  ((In  y-~~,h,;O,l)  = 
(6) 
=  N  (In  Y;I.MJ~) 
where  pn = fin + In fn4  and N (*;l*&  is the formula  for the normal  distribution  function 
with mean  p,, and variance  on un2.  The  parameters  ~_m  and un completely  determine  the 
WFI of individual  n. We will refer to pn and u,, as the “welfare  parameters”  of individual 
n. Formally,  pn and  un2 are  the  log-moments  of  the  lognormal  distribution  function. 
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Formally,  both  V,, and  G,  are  distribution  functions  and  their  equality  implies  the 
equality  of their  log-moments.  The  first two log-moments  of G,, are defined  as 
00  0 
s$  = 
0 
(In j+#dC,(j’)  =  x  a~ll  $  Wnk(t)[In  ~k(t)-ITItI~2,  (8) 
t=  -cm  k=l 
The  equality  of log-moments  implies 
0  N 
pn  =  &+lnf,=  ,L  $4  1  w,k(tl  In j’k(tl+  In f” 
l= -m  k=l 
(9) 
0  N 
o,,‘J =  1  up  1  W,,k(t)[ln  j%(t)-(pn-ln  fO)12 
(10) 
t= -m  &=I 
Thus  the  location  parameter  pCcn  is a  reference  weighted  mean  of  standardized  log- 
incomes.  If individual  n has perceived  many  high incomes, his WFI will be located  far to 
the  right.  If he has mainly  seen  low incomes  the WFI  is located  more  to the left. The 
parameter  u”, which  determines  the  slope  of  the  WFI,  is large  if  the  dispersion  of 
incomes  he  has perceived  is large  (the  WFI  then  has  a flat  slope)  and  is small  if the 
dispersion  is small (the WFI then has a very steep slope). 
Equations  (9) and (10) explain  the variation  of the welfare  parameters  ~_r,  and CJ”  over 
individuals.  In order  to test the validity  of the explanation,  we first need  to take  care  of 
the unobservable  reference  weights w&f).  This is done by means of a string of simplify- 
ing assumptions. 
First,  we  assume  that  all  individuals  give  themselves  the  same  weight  which, 
moreover,  is constant  over  time.  We  write  w,,(t)  = p2 and define  p3: =  l-p,.  For  the 
specification  of  the  number  of  equivalent  adults  in  the  family  we  adopt  the  simple 
assumption  that In&(t) = PO  + j31  lnfsk(t>, wherefsk(t)  is the number of persons in family k 
at time  r. The memory  function  is taken  to be identical  across individuals  as specified  as 
a,(f)  = (1 -a)~-‘. Further  we define 
‘ink(t)  =  W&(t)&,  k  f  n 
=  0  , k=n, 
m”(t)  =  c  Clnk(t)  hYk(t), 
fin(t)  =  k C&t)  h  fkttl  =  DO+  prkx q&t)  ln fskftl} 
k 
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where  I&,(t) is defined  implicitly.  So, m,(t) and h,,(f)  are the log means  of incomes  and 
family  sizes in family  n’s social reference  group  at time  t. 
All this makes  it possible to rewrite  Equation  (9) as 
pn =  In f,  +  (I-a)  5  PI  a-t[  2 In  y,(t)-ln  f,(t)}  +  P3  {%(t)-L(t)ll.  (11) 
l=  -02 
Next  we  apply  the  Koyck  transformation  and  use  the  expression  for  In fn  to  write 
equation  (11) in lagged  form  as follows: 
)I 
n =[l  -p&l  -a)lfl,  fnfs”-aPlfnfsn(-1)+P2(l  -a)fnyn 
(12) 
+  P,(l  -a,m”-  p,c1  -a)j3,hs,L+akr”(-l). 
We can derive a similar expression  for a,*. This expression has been given for instance 
in Kapteyn,  Van de Geer,  and Van de Stadt (1985,  equation  A 1). For  estimation  pur- 
poses it turns out that it is more  convenient  to consider  an expression  for ~1~~  + an2  (the 
second  log-moment  around  zero)  than for a”*.  This expression  turns out to be 
p”, +  +a  *~(_1)-2~~~~(-1~+o~(-1~fnfsn(101  +  +.@n2fs,(-l)+ 
I  I 
(1  -a)  t  w  2+2fi,p,ln  fsn-@n2fs  n 
k=l 
(13) 
The  assumptions  that  are  needed  to  replace  the  inordinate  number  of  reference 
weights in Equations  ( 12) and  ( 13) are  basically  given  in Van  de Stadt,  Kapteyn,  Van  der 
Geer  (1985).  As  an  example  of what  the  assumptions  lead  up to we  notice  that  as a result 
m,  can  be  approximated  as follow: 
;,=lc.  q + (1 -K)S;;;;II+UII,  (14) 
where  17  is mean  log-income  in  society,  1  n y” is mean  log-income  in  the  social  group  of 
individual  IZ  and  U” is an  error  term  independent  In  y,,  and  K is an  unknown  parameter 
that is to be estimated  as a set of individuals who share certain  characteristics,  i.e., within 
a social group  individuals  have the same education  level, are of about the same age, and 
have  a  similar  employment  status  (the  exact  definition  of  the  characteristics  is given 
below  in  “Data  and  Estimation  Results”). 
The  parameter  K  measures  what  share  of  the  reference  group  of  individual  n  lies 
within  his  social  group.  If  K =O, the  social  group  comprises  the  reference  group;  if  K  = 1 
the  social  group  of  an  individual  does  not  yield  any  information  about  the  reference 
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Approximating  the  other  reference  weighted  quantities  in  Equations  (12)  and  (13)  in  a 
similar  way  yields  the  following  estimable  model: 
+  (l-a)  (l-02)  (l-~)ln~-  (l-a)  (l-p2)  (l++ln  fs,+c, 
~n2+o,2=~o+a[(~,2+a,2)  (Cl)1  +  2Ptp,lnfs,  +  aPt21n2fsn(-l)  - 
BaPllr,,ln  &(-I)  +  (l-a)Pzln2y,,-2/3r(1-a)fizln  ynln  fs,  + 
(16) 
I(l-a)P2-1  I fit~lnzfs,  +  (l-a)  (I-K)  (1.Ij2)In2y,  - 
2(1-a)  (I-K)  (l-p21  Pllny,ln  fs,,  +  (l-a)  (I-K)  (l-(32)  pt2ln2fs,,  +  <,, 
where  TO and  60 are  the  constant  terms  in  the  equations  and  en and  5” are  error  terms  that 
have  been  added  to  account  for  specification  and  measurement  error.  The  error  terms 
are  assumed  to  be  multivariate  normally  distributed  with  mean  zero  and  unrestricted 
covariance  matrix.  Given  these  assumptions,  the  parameters  in  the  simultaneous  system 
(Equations  [ 151  and  [ 161)  can  be  estimated  by  means  of  maximum  likelihood.  The 
estimation  results  are  given  in  the  next  section.  It is the  first  time  that  Equations  ( 15) and 
(16)  are  estimated  jointly.  In  previous  papers  only  Equation  (15)  has  been  estimated. 
Using  the  additional  Equation  ( 16)  improves  the  efficiency  of the  estimates. 
DATA AND  ESTIMATION  RESULTS 
The  data  comes  from  an  annual  household  panel  in The  Netherlands.  We  have  used  the 
waves  of  198 1 and  1982.  Household  heads  were  interviewed  in March  198 1 and  March 
1982.  The  characteristics  that  define  the  social  groups  are  education,  employment  status, 
age.  Five  education  levels  are  distinguished,  three  states  of employment  (self-employed, 
employee,  not  employed),  and  five  age  brackets  (less  than  or equal  to 30,3  l-39,40-49, 
50-65,  over  65).  This  lends  to  a maximum  of 5.3.5  = 75  social  groups,  38  of which  are 
represented  in  the  sample.  There  are  629  observations.  Results  of  the  maximum  likeli- 
hood  estimation  of  Equations  ( 15)  and  ( 16)  are  given  in  Table  1. 
The  coefficients  of  determination  are  quite  acceptable  for  both  equations,  given  that 
the  data  are  household  data.  The  various  parameters  have  been  estimated  with  consider- 
able  accuracy,  except  for  K. This  parameter,  which  describes  how  informative  social 
groups  are  for  reference  groups,  does  not  differ  significantly  from  one  (in  which  case 
social  groups  are  completely  uninformative).  This  has  also  been  a  finding  in  previous 
research  (e.g.,  Van  de  Stadt,  Kapteyn,  Van  de  Geer,  1985)  and  indicates  the  need  to  use 
data  with  specific  information  on  reference  groups.  Fortunately  such  data  will  be 
available  soon. 
The  parameter  PI  is an  elasticity.  It represents  the  percentage  increase  in  income  that 
is needed  to keep  a family  at its current  welfare  level  if family  size  increases  by  1%. Thus 
the  estimate  for  PI  implies  that  an  increase  of  family  size  by  1%  requires  an  income Preference  Formation,  incomes  and  the  Distribution  of  Welfare  a5 
Table I 
Estimation  Results 
Parameter  Estimate 
a  0.64 
an  1.16 
PI  0.27 
02  0.60 
P3  0.40 
6”  11.31 
K  0.83 
R2 p-equation  0.79 
RZ p2 + &equation  0.80 






(2.3  I) 
(0.52) 
increase  by  0.27%.  The  parameters  PZ and PS represent  the relative  influence  of own 
income  and  incomes  of others  on present  preferences.  Apparently  own  income  (habit 
formation)  is  somewhat  more  important  than  the  income  of  others  (preference 
interdependence). 
The  estimate  of  a  implies  the  following  weights  for  periods  0,  -1,  -2,.  . . , -8,.  . 
respectively:  0.36,0.23,0.15,0.09,0.06,0.04,0.02,0.02,0.01,.  . . Thus events that took 
place  more  than eight years  ago get a weight of less than  1%. 
Given  the  model  estimates  one  can  simulate  the  welfare  effects  of  various  income 
policies. To this we turn to the next section. 
PREFERENCE  FORMATION,  INCOMES,  AND  THE  DISTRIBUTION  OF  WELFARE 
Figure  2 presents  the cumulative  distribution  of welfare  levels5 in the sample  for three 
income  groups.  These  groups  represent  the lowest  one-third,  the middle  one-third  and 
the  highest  one-third  in  the  sample  respectively.  As  one  would  expect,  the  welfare 
distribution  for  the highest  income  group  is located  most  to the right  and that  for  the 
lowest income  group  most to the left. In the lowest income  group  approximately  40% of 
the  individuals  evaluate  their  income  by  a  number  below  0.5. In the  middle  income 
group  approximately  15% of  the  individuals  evaluate  income  by  a  number  less than 
one-half.  In the highest income  group  the percentage  is approximately  six. 
According  to model  (Equations  [ 151 and  [ 161) the observed  distribution  of welfare 
levels depends on the distribution  incomes  and family sizes presently  and in the past, and 
on individual  effects  represented  by the error  terms  in the equations.  In the  sequel  we 
simplify matters  a bit by ignoring the error terms. Further,  family sizes are assumed to be 
constant  over  time  and  for  incomes  we  mostly  consider  steady  state  situations,  i.e., 
situations  in which all incomes  are constant  or grow  at a constant  rate. 
As a first example,  Figure  3 represents  the distribution  of welfare  for the same three 
groups  as distinguished  above  for the situation where  incomes  have been constant  for a 
long time. The distances  between  the distributions  are substantially  larger than in Figure 
2. This  is partly  due  to  the  neglect  of  the  error  terms.  The  error  terms  tend  to  blur 
systematic  differences.  Also, however,  keeping  incomes constant  takes away variation  in 
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slopes  of the  WFI  and  therefore  the  evaluation  of  income  varies  less  with  income.  This 
can  also  be  seen  directly  from  Equation  (6).  Altogether,  the  differences  between  the 
three  income  groups  are  quite  dramatic  now.  In  the  lowest  income  group  almost  no  one 
reaches  a welfare  level  above  one-half  whereas  in  net  highest  income  group  almost  no 
one  has  a welfare  level  below  0.5. 
In  Figure  4 we  drop  the  distinction  between  the  three  income  groups,  but  concentrate 
instead  on  the  effect  of  economic  growth.  Obviously,  and  not  surprisingly,  the  highest 
growth  rate  generates  the  highest  welfare  levels,  although  in  all  cases  the  variation  in 
welfare  levels  remains  substantial. 
Although  in  theory  a steady  state  is defined  as a situation  in which  all  incomes  grow  at 
the  same  rate  (possibly  zero)  for  an  infinitely  long  time,  in  practice  a  steady  state  will 
exist  for  a limited  period  of time.  To  see  how  long  a steady  state  has  to last  in  order  for 
the  welfare  distribution  to  attain  its  steady  state  form,  we  illustrate  the  speed  of conver- 
gence  empirically  in  Figure  5. As one  can  see,  after  ten  years  the  steady  state  distribution 
has  practically  been  attained.  Figure  5 also  shows  that  the  steady  state  with  zero  growth 
generates  lower  welfare  than  the  initial  situation  in  the  sample.  The  explanation  is that 
the  individuals  in  the  sample  have  experienced  a long  spell  of  income  growth  (it  is only 
after  ‘82  that  incomes  in  The  Netherlands  started  falling),  which  increases  their  welfare 
(recall  Figure  4). 
To  the  extent  that  there  exists  limits  to  growth  one  may  wonder  whether  a  more 
equitable  distribution  of  welfare  is obtainable  through  a redistribution  of  incomes.  The 
effect  of  such  a policy  is illustrated  in  Figure  6 (A  and  B). In  both  cases  the  effects  are 
studied  of a more  egalitarian  and  less  egalitarian  distribution  of incomes  on  the  distribu- 
tion  of welfare.  In  Figure  6 (A)  the  distribution  takes  place  while  keeping  the  mean  of all 
incomes  constant.  In  Figure  6  (B)  the  redistribution  takes  place  while  keeping  the 
median  of all  incomes  constant  (actually,  the  geometric  mean  of incomes  has  been  kept 
constant,  but  this  amounts  practically  to  the  same  thing). 
The  way  the  redistribution  has  been  implemented  can  be  described  as follows.  Let  the 
incomes  before  redistribution  be  yl,  ~2,. . . ,y n,. .  ,yN  and  after  redistribution  ZI, ZZ,.  .  ,  zn, 
zN.  As  a  measure  for  the  dispersion  of  incomes  we  take  the  log-variance  of  incomes. 
Imagine  we  want  to increase  the  log  variance  by  a factor  p’ (p  may  be  smaller  than  one). 
Then  the  following  relation  should  hold  between  the  incomes  before  and  after 
redistribution: 
Ii  R 
N 
(In2  -  Kz)2=p2  x  (lny,-  In)‘,  (17) 
fl=l  n=l 
with  In  z and  In  y  means  of  log-incomes  in  the  sample  after  and  before  redistribution 
respectively.  Of course,  Equation  ( 17) does  not  fully  determine  the  incomes  z”. There  are 
various  redistribution  schemes  that  all  satisfy  Equation  (17).  We  have  chosen  the  follow- 
ing  scheme.  The  incomes  of families  are  adjusted  according  to 
-  - 
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where  y  is chosen  in  such  a way  that  either  the  mean  or  the  median  of  incomes  is the 
same  before  and  after  redistribution.  To  obtain  a more  egalitarian  distribution  we  have 
set  p  =  l/4  and  for  a more  unequal  distribution  j3 has  been  set  equal  to  four. 
Figure  6 (A  and  B) show  that  income  redistribution  hardly  leads  to a redistribution  of 
welfare.  Given  that  the  evaluation  of  one’s  own  income  is fundamentally  a function  of 
the  ranking  of  this  income  in  a perceived  income  distribution  this  need  not  surprise  us 
too  much. 
It is possible,  however,  to devise  a more  intelligent  redistribution  policy.  This  policy  is 
presented  in  Figure  7. On  the  basis  of the  estimated  model  one  can  redistribute  incomes 
in  such  a way  that  differences  in  family  composition  are  fully  compensated  for.  This  has 
been  done  by  “abolishing”  the  existing  family  allowance  system.  That  is, for each  family 
the  family  allowance  is deducted  from  its  after  tax  income  (in  The  Netherlands  family 
allowance  benefits  are  not  taxable).  In  this  way  a fund  is created  that  is available  for  a 
new  family  allowance  system.  To  compute  the  new  family  allowance  for each  family  we 
note  that  two  families  of  sizes  fsi,  and  fsz  evaluate  their  incomes  ye and  y2 by  the  same 
number  if there  holds 
y2  fi2  8, 
--  -  - 
Yl 
(  1  b  1 
(19) 
In  this  case  the  ratio  of the  number  of equivalent  adults  in both  families  equals  the  ratio 
of incomes  of both  families. 
Let  us  take  a  family  without  children  (fs  =  2)  as  our  standard family.  Let  zn be  the 
income  of family  n after  deduction  of the  old  family  allowance.  Then  this  family  receives 
a new  allowance  such  that  its  new  income  w,  satisfies 
(20) 
Unfortunately,  the  fund  is  not  big  enough  to  cover  all  outlays  for  the  new  system. 
Hence  a proportional  tax  is levied  on  z,  such  that  outlays  for  the  system  can  be  covered 
exactly.  The  results  of this  operation  are  shown  in  Figure  7. 
Obviously,  the  proposed  redistribution  substantially  reduces  the  observed  inequality  in 
welfare  levels.  Thus  this  form  of income  policy,  which  is directly  based  on  differences  in 
need  across  families,  is considerably  more  powerful  than  policies  which  aim  at a reduc- 
tion  of inequality  without  specific  consideration  of individual  wants. 
Looking  at  the  various  examples  considered,  a couple  of  observations  can  be  made. 
First,  the  relative  nature  of the  preference  formation  theory  implies  that  income  redistri- 
bution  is basically  a zero  sum  game.  For  a given  size  of national  income,  the  distribution 
of  income  appears  to  have  little  effect  on  the  distribution  of  welfare.  There  is  an 
exception,  however,  income  distribution  policy  can  affect  the  distribution  of  welfare 
substantially  if it uses  specific  information  on  the  relative  needs  of households. Preference  Formation,  Incomes  and  the  Distribution  of  Welfare  95 
A second  observation  is that  economic  growth  is an  important  contributor  to  the 
welfare  of individuals  in society. The level of national  income  is relevant  to the distribu- 
tion  of  welfare,  but  the  faster  national  income  grows  the  higher  the  welfare  level  in 
society  will be.6 Even with a stagnating  economy  a policy maker  can improve  welfare in 
society  by creating  steep age income  profiles.  One then pays little to young  people  and 
increases  payments  with  increasing  age.  Of course  a policy  like  this has  to rest  on  a 
consensus  that  lets  young  people  abstain  from  payment  according  to  their  marginal 
product  in exchange  for a continually  rising income  when they get older. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This article has reviewed  a theory of preference  formation  and has considered  its bearing 
on income  policy. The policy measures  we looked  at were only arbitrary  selections  from 
a wide gamut. Given the tool of the WFI and the model that operationalizes  the theory  of 
preference  formation,  one can compute  the welfare distribution  resulting from just about 
any policy. 
Altogether,  both the theory  of preference  formation  and the WFI appear  to be reason- 
ably well established.  Yet, regarding  the WFI more  attention  should be paid to methods 
that  improve  its reliability  and validity  (see  Ratchford,  1985; Kapteyn  and Wansbeek, 
1985b). 
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NOTES 
1. Whenever we speak of “income” we mean after-tax family income. “Family” and “house- 
hold”  are used synonomously. 
2.  When  we  speak  of  “individuals”  or  “respondents”  these  are  usually  family  heads.  The 
words “he”  and  “she”  are used indiscriminantly. 
3.  Recall  that  an individual  is by definition  head  of a household.  Hence  we can  equivalently 
speak  of “the income  of family  k” and  “the income  of individual  k.” 
4.  Whenever  t = 0 we omit  the argument  t. So, for examplef,  +fn(O), pn = p”(O), etc. 
5.  The  term  “welfare  level”  is used  here  solely  to denote  an  individual’s  evaluation  of his 
income  according  to his WFI. 
6.  Up to a limit,  see Kapteyn,  van der Geer, and  van  deStadt  (1985,  Appendix  A). 
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